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Abstract
The reformulated duty of  loyalty now found in s 172 of  the Companies Act 2006 has been seen as
imprecise or an ambiguous development for directors’ duties. It has generated debate about what is the best
reading of  the duty, the most fundamental aspect of  which is whether this behavioural standard obliges a
narrow focus on financial capital or a broader notion of  well-being and inclusiveness amongst non-
shareholder interests. This article argues that the law as a privileged and constitutive way of  society-making
can only be understood within a broader conceptual framework rather than the more traditional expository
analysis of  law. The context in which such an analysis takes place is that of  the anti-collectivist, market-
based political project of  neoliberalsm. When viewed through this explanatory lens, we see very clearly that
English legal doctrine codifies an embedded relationship between managers and shareholders. In doing so, the
article shows that the extraction of  private benefits of  control by shareholders is not an inevitable occurrence,
but a decades-long, human-created and contingent phenomenon. While non-shareholder interests are
introduced into the duty, this precatory element is merely a potential source of  legitimacy to the ideology of
the company as a private, exclusively shareholder-oriented enterprise.
1 Introduction
Anewspaper cartoon from the middle of  the twentieth century depicts a US senatortelling his colleagues, ‘I admit this new Bill is too complicated to understand. We will
just have to pass it to find out what it means.’1 The meaningfulness of  this satirical
reflection on the very real difficulties inherent in the reading of  legislation might be said to
find expression in the recent statement of  seven codified general duties that are imposed
on company directors found in ch 2 of  pt 10 of  the Companies Act 2006. Prior to the
enactment of  the 2006 Act the behavioural standards expected of  corporate management
were instantiated in a highly problematic regulatory mixture of  common law rules and
equitable principles. The vanguard of  this new statutory scheme of  obligations is the
reformulated duty of  loyalty now found in s 172, which determines the propriety of
directorial conduct under all the subsequent duties. It follows that it has the potential to
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1 This example is provided in F Frankfurter, ‘Some Reflections on the Reading of  Statutes’ (1947) 47 Columbia
Law Review 527, 545.
provide some guidance for directors in the carrying out of  their other functions. More
fundamental still is that the framing of  the duty of  loyalty is said to endorse and enshrine
the animating idea of  enlightened shareholder value, which was of  central importance to the
company law reform project.2 This principle is related to corporate governance as it
provides for how public or private companies are to be managed in the realisation of
chosen organisational objectives.
Naturally enough, the effect of  introducing a prescribed code of  behaviour for directors
is to throw the law into a period of  uncertainty as to its best reading, based on the
difficulties inherent in the nature of  language used, of  composition and of  legislation
generally.3 Many open issues remain about how the courts will apply the reformulated duty
of  loyalty, the most fundamental of  which involve whether this behavioural standard merely
replicates the common law position or represents a more radical departure from the
traditional conception of  the duty. Additionally, the duty explicitly suggests a highly
subjective compliance test that requires a director to act in the way he or she considers, in good
faith, to be most likely to promote the success of  the company for the benefit of  the
members as a whole. Consequently, there would appear to be no definite standard against
which to evaluate the propriety of  any given decision. Taken as a whole, it is difficult to
anticipate how the operation of  the individual components of  the duty will work in practice.
A problem in statutory construction can seriously trouble the courts when there is a contest
between probabilities of  meaning. Legal academics and practitioners have thus fervently
spent a considerable portion of  time reading, discussing and producing interpretations and
evaluations of  the best reading of  s 172. This dialogue has often in various ways involved
reference to the Company Law Review reports and ministerial debates in order to ascertain
the purpose of  economic organisation.4 However, there has been up to this point only
hidden or half-articulated discussion on how corporate governance operates in the context
of  major ideological and institutional processes. This unsatisfactory understanding of  how
these rules function in the context of  extraneous bias and distortion, and the profound
effect this can have on law-making, constitutes a significant lacuna in our understanding of
the law that this article seeks to fill.
This article argues that the highly subjective nature of  the duty can be likened without
any great inaccuracy to the originating judicially formulated standard of  review that enabled
directors’ good faith judgement to render their legal obligations according to situational
expectations. It is submitted that this purported continuity of  the statutory version,
however, necessarily operates within the context of  all forms of  law as social practices. In
other words, the subjective nature of  the duty and how it is interpreted will be given
meaning by the overlaying cultural, ideological and practical context that organisational
activity gives rise to. It is thus essential to read the reformulated duty within a broader
conceptual framework rather than the more traditional approach of  substantive ‘black
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2 J Lowry, ‘The Duty of  Loyalty of  Company Directors: Bridging the Accountability Gap through Efficient
Disclosure’ (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 607, 608, describing the review as ‘the most far-reaching review
of  company law since Gladstone’s Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 and the introduction of  Limited Liability
in 1855’.
3 H R Hahlo, ‘Here Lies the Common Law: Rest in Peace’ (1967) 30 Modern Law Review 241, 249, remarking
that, ‘[t]he immediate effect of  the introduction of  a code, so far from making the law more certain, is to
create a lengthy period of  uncertainty’. See also, Lord Hoffmann, ‘Fifth John Lehane Memorial Lecture: The
Influence of  European Law on the Common Law in English Courts’, 18 August 2010, Sydney, Australia, para
12 <www.allens.com.au/pubs/pdf/paplehane10.pdf> accessed 27 August 2013; Lord Hoffman in A v
Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 AC 68, [88].
4 On the measured use of  legislative history in statutory interpretation, see Pepper v Hart [1992] UKHL 3. For
academic criticism, see A Kavanagh, ‘Pepper v Hart and Matters of  Constitutional Principle’ (2005) Law
Quarterly Review 98.
letter’ or ‘expository’ analysis of  law. Central to this understanding is that the canons of
statutory interpretation have a place, but it is secondary, after elucidation of  more
fundamental issues concerning law as a privileged and constitutive way of  society-making.
The significant explanatory power of  this lens draws our attention to the way in which
distinct regulatory choices, which are driven by distinct policy preferences, form the law and
the application of  that law. So, the article explores the strength of  the case for corporate
governance to be understood as a systemic process which is determined mostly in
accordance with prevailing institutional arrangements that lie largely outside the corporate
organisation and the parameters of  company law.
The prevailing context in which these institutional arrangements find expression, it will
be argued, is that of  a globalised, interconnected and interdependent world, the defining
characteristics of  which are the anti-collectivist, market-based political project of
neoliberalism and short-term equity market imperatives of  financial capitalism. If  we look
inside the new statutory reformulation of  the duty, we see very clearly that it enshrines and
endorses a strongly oriented shareholder prerogative. The genesis of  this avowedly narrow
duty of  loyalty has its origins in the Company Law Review’s expressed ideological
presumption against interventionist legislation and in favour of  facilitating markets.5 It is
these ideological pressures and the globalisation of  product and financial markets, it is
submitted, which mandate a consensus on the shareholder-oriented model of  the
company.6 This is despite the fact that English legal doctrine has hitherto never provided
unequivocal credence to this position.7 Neoliberal thinking as a discipline-shaping
phenomenon influences not only the role and expectations of  most shareholders,8 but also
the corporate organisation and the architecture of  company law. Although there is an
expectation in the UK and in Europe generally that shareholders should behave
responsibly,9 neoliberalism allows shareholders the freedom to necessarily possess short-
term, profit-maximising goals that lead them to seek out the highest returns in a global
economy.10 This legal myopia precludes the moral choice of  harmonising the interests of
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5 Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Strategic Framework (Department of  Trade
and Industry 1999) paras 2.1–2.34. On this issue, see S Worthington, ‘Reforming Directors’ Duties’ (2001)
64(3) Modern Law Review 439, 443.
6 H Hansmann and R Kraakman, ‘The End of  History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal
439, 468.
7 M Moore and A Rebérioux, ‘Revitalising the Institutional Roots of  Anglo-American Corporate Governance’
(2011) 40 Economy and Society 84, 86.
8 Of  course, even though shareholders set the ‘rules of  the game’ through corporate contractual arrangements
and proprietary claims of  capital, it must be acknowledged that there will likely be some variance between the
expectations of  shareholders according to the type of  company, particular organisational objectives etc. See
D Attenborough, ‘Enforcement of  Corporate Conduct under the Equitable Maximisation and Viability
Principle’ (2013) 33(4) Legal Studies 650, 651, observing that: ‘[t]he context and structure of  corporate law
mean that a myriad of  institutions can be established and operated for diverse purposes, with the corporate
constitution often stating the substantive aims for which it has been registered. These written constitutional
objectives may, in turn, be significantly different for commercial, as opposed to not-for-profit, organisations
and even amongst the spectrum of  profit making entities. In this sense, it is impossible for intellectual
endeavour to prescribe such a construct as “a” corporate purpose or objective that related to existing
facultative corporate law or that law generally.’
9 A Dignam, ‘The Future of  Shareholder Democracy in the Shadow of  the Financial Crisis’ (2013) 36 Seattle
University Law Review 639, 690. Dignam refers to the Companies Act 2006 preferring the term members rather
than shareholders to describe equity holders. He goes on to suggest astutely that, ‘[m]ember probably more
accurately conveys the expectation that we have for shareholders to participate in the corporation, abide by
the rules, and behave responsibly. We assume at the policy level that shareholders want to be good, if  only
they could. And if  they are not, there must be some technical impediment to unleashing their goodness.’
10 L Talbot, ‘Why Shareholders Shouldn’t Vote: A Marxist-progressive Critique of  Shareholder Empowerment’
(2013) 76 Modern Law Review 791, 793.
shareholders with the interests of  a host of  other corporate participants. Viewed this way,
the introduction of  non-shareholder interests into the statutory lexicon might be best read
as a precatory aspect of  the duty that dissolves notions of  distributional fairness. Indeed, it
is argued that statutory provision for non-shareholder interests is a potential source of
legitimacy to ‘an implicit alliance between managers and investors’.11
The article will not, quite, be attempting to answer the question, analytically and
empirically, of  whether the integration of  non-shareholder interests into the management
calculus should mean a concomitant downgrading of  the presumptive imperatives of
private capital-owning investors – much less whether it is desirable enough to warrant a
radical revision of  English company law. It will be satisfactory if  the article can provide a
clarifying vantage point from which to approach the particular legislative reform of  the duty
of  loyalty in companies. This article proceeds in four stages. Initially, section 2 outlines
neoliberalism and financialised capitalism in broad terms and only to the extent necessary
to explain a primary concern in section 3 of  this paper – that is, how a broad social theory
can help us to understand and explain s 172 as well as to assess why the logic and language
of  these ideologies are antagonistic to the concept of  ‘enlightened’ corporate performance.
Section 4 provides a more detailed examination of  the two aspects comprising the
reformulated duty of  loyalty. In doing so, it provides a more favourable interpretation of
the provision which disperses any legislative ambiguities and makes a compelling case for
how the Act is to be read. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Neoliberalism and financialised capitalism
This section of  the article considers the emergence of  the neoliberal economic order. The
aim is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of  neoliberalism. There are many interesting
issues in this regard, but they have been addressed extensively elsewhere.12 The ideology is
outlined in preliminary terms and only to the extent necessary to explain a primary concern
of  this paper – that is, how the key to understanding s 172 is to be found in the hegemonic
influence of  neoliberalism on ways of  thought and political-economic practices everywhere
since the 1970s. The proposition that the law does not exist in a vacuum would today
scarcely be an exciting truth. The notion that no aspect of  law can be understood unless it
is seen within the perspective of  a broader social theory or political philosophy surely has
been commonplace for at least a century.13 William Twining has said of  understanding legal
rules that in order to understand law in the world today it is more important than ever to
reorientate and engage with epistemology to reach the realities of  all forms of  law as social
practices.14 This, in Karl Llewellyn’s words, is ‘to see it whole’.15 It is a truism that we are,
to some extent, creatures of  our time and space. Of  course, the context in which such an
analysis takes place is that of  a globalised, interconnected and interdependent world.
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11 R Boyer, ‘From Shareholder Value to CEO Power: The Paradox of  the 1990s’ (2005) 9 Competition and
Change 7, 21.
12 For general discussion, see N Chomsky, Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order (Seven Stories Press
1998); D Harvey, A Brief  History of  Neoliberalism (OUP 2007); S L Mudge, ‘What is Neoliberalism?’ (2008) 6
Socio-Economic Review 703; R Plant, The Neoliberal State (OUP 2010). For a classic critique of  some form of
nascent neoliberalism brought about following the end of  the Second World War, see K Polanyi, The Great
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of  Our Time (2nd edn Beacon Press 2002).
13 The intellectual heritage of  such Western jurisprudence contains a large number of  ‘accredited schools’, with
legions of  scholars competing to articulate their favourite critical thesis or approach: positivism, natural law,
law and economics, neo-Marxism, critical legal studies, feminist theories, critical race theory, legal pluralism
and so on. 
14 W Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (CUP 2009) 7.
15 K Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Little, Brown & Co 1960) 508–20.
Globalisation is the underlying structural dynamic that drives social, political, economic and
cultural ideological processes around the world in the twenty-first century.16 A defining
characteristic of  globalisation is well articulated by David Harvey, who observes that, since
the 1970s, ‘[d]eregulation, privatisation, and withdrawal of  the state from many areas of
social provision have been all too common. Almost all states . . . have embraced, sometimes
voluntarily and in other instances in response to coercive pressures, some version of
neoliberal theory and adjusted at least some policies and practices accordingly.’17 The
contemporary era has, as we shall see, been fundamentally driven by the definite political
project of  neoliberalism.
Neoliberalism has been transformed from a set of  embryonic antecedents,18 ostensibly
driven by an efficiently distributive thought collective19 as well as the forces of
globalisation, to become a forceful and entrenched political project over recent decades in
nearly all parts of  the world. The ideology has not only become hegemonic among
mainstream thinkers and political elites in the UK and USA but has also had a major impact
on legal policy and the way we think about law.20 The ideology, of  necessity, carries with it
very definite understandings of  the way we as a society inhabit and understand the world,
notably an institutionalised and unquestioning cognitive adherence to standard neoclassical
economics.21 Neoliberalism proposes, at least at the discursive level, that a necessary
condition for human well-being is the maximisation of  entrepreneurial freedoms within an
institutional framework characterised by private property rights of  ownership,
individualism, wholly unregulated markets and free trade.22 A discipline-shaping set of
shared ideological precepts articulate a vision of  the free society in which economic
rationality of  the markets is the optimal way of  organising economic activity because they
are self-correcting, associated with competition, optimum economic efficiency and choice.
This relates to company law in at least one central way insofar as ‘[a] totally unfettered
market for corporate control is literally all that is needed for near ideal corporate
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16 W I Robinson, A Theory of  Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World (John Hopkins
University Press 2004) xv.
17 Harvey (n 12) 3. See also, J Dragsbaek Schmidt and J Hersh, ‘Neoliberal Globalization: Workforce Without
Welfare’ (2006) 3 Globalizations 69, 69. It should be noted, however, that a multitude of  partial, divergent and
often contradictory claims surround the contested concept of  globalisation. On this, see J A Scholte,
Globalization: A Critical Introduction (Palgrave 2005) 15ff.
18 R S Turner, ‘The Rebirth of  Liberalism: The Origins of  Neoliberal Ideology’ (2007) 12 Journal of  Political
Ideologies 67. Here, the author traces back to the 1940s the genesis of  neoliberalism as well as specifying the
efforts to revive and redefine classical liberalism as a mainstream political ideology. See also, D Kotz,
‘Neoliberalism and the US Economic Expansion of  the 90s’ (2003) 54 Monthly Review 15, 15, submitting that
neoliberalism is an updated and more extreme version of  the ‘classical liberal’ economic theory developed in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who argued that a capitalist
economy is largely self-regulating through the action of  market forces.
19 B Jackson, ‘At the Origins of  Neoliberalism: The Free Economy and the Strong State, 1930–1947’ (2010) 53
Historical Journal 129, 129–30.
20 P Ireland, ‘Law and the Neoliberal Vision: Financial Property, Pension Privatisation and the Ownership
Society’ (2011) 62(1) Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 1, 2.
21 J L Campbell and O K Pederson (eds), The Rise of  Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis (Princeton University
Press 2001) 5.
22 Harvey (n 12) 5. On the seductive rhetoric of  neoliberalism, Harvey posits that ‘[a] conceptual apparatus has
to be advanced that appeals to our intuitions and instincts, to our values and our desires, as well as to the
possibilities inherent in the social world we inhabit. If  successful, this conceptual apparatus becomes so
embedded in common sense as to be taken for granted and not open to question.’ See also, Polanyi (n 12) 266,
making the insightful point that this form of  thinking envisages ‘a market view of  society which equate[s]
economics with contractual relationships, and contractual relations with freedom’.
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governance’.23 The influence of  these markets in disciplining and incentivising corporate
directors, of  course, includes the usual competitive pressures found in relevant product and
services markets as well as capital markets and the market for executive talent.24 This ‘free’
market metaphor is deeply embedded in Anglo-American culture;25 an autonomous market
that is constrained only by competition, so we are told, ensures that individual rational
actors navigating anonymous market signals and making optimal decisions in the allocation
of  capital and the pursuit of  self-interested gain maximises overall social well-being. The
role of  the state is rendered as rent-seeking, inefficient and restrictive. It is, thus, an ideology
that works to ‘displace political sovereignty with the sovereignty of  “the market”, as if  the
latter had a mind and morality of  its own’.26 The very recourse to markets and the private
sector would appear to eviscerate the importance of  law and regulation, or even render it
unnecessary.27
However plausible the intellectual efforts might appear, the actual political-economic
policies and practices of  neoliberalism frequently diverge from this ideological narrative. As
Paddy Ireland has argued convincingly, ‘you simply cannot understand the changes in the
global financial markets since the early 1970s in terms of  deregulation’.28 Ireland goes on
to observe that ‘markets are legal, political (and, therefore, regulatory) products, not
spontaneously arising, pre-regulatory, pre-legal and pre-political phenomena’.29 In other
words, not all corporate legal jurists are, or at least ought to be, trapped within this paradigm
of  a ‘rolling back of  the state’ when it comes to the UK commercial legal landscape. In
particular, the crude discourse frequently conducted through the prism of  simplistic
opposites of  state versus market, it is argued, does not in fact accurately reflect the presence
of  an active, often activist, and sometimes violent, regulatory state in most neoliberal
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 65(4)
23 H Manne, ‘Corporate Governance: Getting Back to Market Basics’ paper to Seminario Consob
<www.consob.it/documenti/Pubblicazioni/Convegni_seminari/seminario_20081110_manne.pdf> accessed
27 August 2013.
24 L Johnson, ‘Corporate Law Professors as Gatekeepers’ (2009) 6(2) University of  St Thomas Law Journal 447,
448.
25 On the naturalisation of  expressions of  neoliberal ideology, see Harvey (n 12) 5–6. The author suggests that:
‘[f]or any system of  thought to become dominant, a conceptual apparatus has to be advanced that appeals to
our intuitions and instincts, to our values and our desires, as well as to the possibilities inherent in the social
world we inhabit. If  successful, this conceptual apparatus becomes so embedded in common sense as to be
taken for granted and not open to questions. The founding figures of  neoliberal thought took political ideals
of  human dignity and individual freedom as fundamental.’ On the wider capture of  state and society (media,
politics, academia), see O Visser and D Kalb, ‘Financialised Capitalism Soviet Style? Varieties of  State Capture
and Crisis’ (2010) 51 European Journal of  Sociology 171, 188, observing that: ‘[s]igns of  the fundamental
flaws of  the system [are] presented as instances of  deplorable individual greed, moral hazard, fraud or
corruption and [are] pictured as exceptional excesses that [should] be punished. It [leaves] the status quo
largely undisputed.’
26 J Comaroff  and J L Comaroff, Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming (Duke University Press
2001) 333.
27 A C Aman, ‘Law, Markets and Democracy: A Role for Law in the Neoliberal State’ (2006) 51 New York Law
School Review 802, 809.
28 Ireland (n 20) 15.
29 Ibid 29.
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varieties of  capitalism.30 It follows that it is partial and therefore misleading to focus any
corporate governance discussion on the minimal state as well as public intervention as a
negative of  the market. In the final analysis, the responsibility for promoting neoliberalism
as a political project remains with individual nation states; so any given state is not typically
a neutral policymaker in relation to aspects of  the corporate organisation and the limits of
company law. It is instead submitted that the purest conception of  neoliberal practice is that
it ‘was never about total withdrawal of  the state; it was about a qualitative restructuring of
the state, involving not so much less state intervention as a different kind of  state intervention
[my emphasis added]’.31 Hutchinson and Jones, equally, have asserted that it is never a
matter of  whether the state should act, but exactly when and how it should regulate social life
and economic activity.32 The central insight is that the state is not, as some suggest, external
or involuntarily relinquishing sovereignty,33 but is a state that purposefully establishes and
preserves through constant action an artificial institutional framework appropriate to such
competitive practices.34 If  markets do not exist, then they must be created or reconfigured,
by state action if  necessary. But beyond these efforts the state should stay out of  the
economy, including corporate affairs.
Neoliberal restructuring, then, is a type of  regulatory capture which focuses on reorienting
the role of  the state in the introduction, implementation and reproduction of  neoliberalsm.
Since the 1970s the neoliberal, globalised economy has been typically associated with
privatisation, commercialisation and commodification, with the aim of  privileging and
intensifying the conditions necessary for profit-making and to form a framework for private
capital accumulation.35 In order to encourage an institutional framework within which the
market-based logic can operate, there needs to be a removal of  impediments to free
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30 D Campbell, ‘Review Article: The End of  Posnerian Law and Economics’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 305,
326, unrestrainedly observing that: ‘[n]o market . . . can conform to the assumptions of  fully contingent
contracting, nor exist free of  regulation, and so full deregulation is an absurd goal of  economic policy’. See
also Ireland (n 20) 23, noting that ‘[n]eoliberalism has indeed entailed some deregulation, not least in the
financial sphere, but, in general, what we have seen in recent decades is not so much a retreat as a major change
in the nature and forms of  state activity. In many spheres, there has been a marked increase in interventionism,
not only by states but by international agencies, much of  it . . . directed at creating “good climates for
investment”. The financial crisis occurred in a heavily regulated world and those who seek to understand the
neoliberal era only at the ideological level, in terms of  its self-professed determination to free markets from
states, will struggle to make sense of  actual neoliberal practice.’; Polanyi (n 12) 258, writing that ‘[e]conomic
history reveals that . . . the market has been the outcome of  a conscious and often violent intervention on the
part of  government which imposed the market organization on society for noneconomic ends’.
31 M B Aalbers, ‘Neoliberalism is Dead . . . Long Live Neoliberalism’ (2013) 37 International Journal of  Urban
and Regional Research 1083, 1084. See also, D Cahill, ‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism and the Global
Financial Crisis’ (2010) 20 Labour and History 298, 300.
32 A Hutchinson and M Jones, ‘Wheeler Dealing: An Essay on Law, Politics, and Speech’ (1988) 15 Journal of
Law and Society 263, 274.
33 A Dignam and M Galanis, ‘Corporate Governance and the Importance of  Macroeconomic Context’ (2008)
28 Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies 201, 206, who posit that global macro-economic conditions may
precipitate an unavoidable loss of  governmental sovereignty with regard to choice of  corporate governance
system. See also, I Ramonet, ‘Disarming the Market’ Le Monde diplomatique (Paris December 1997)
<http://mondediplo.com/1997/12/leader> accessed 28 October 2014, remarking that: ‘Financial
globalization is a law unto itself  and it has established a separate supranational state with its own
administrative apparatus, its own spheres of  influence, its own means of  action. That is to say, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Organization of  Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) . . . This artificial state is a power with no
base in society. It is answerable instead to the financial markets and the mammoth business undertakings that
are its masters. The result is that the real states in the real world are becoming societies with no power base.’
34 Harvey (n 12) 2. See also, B Amable, ‘Morals and Politics in the Ideology of  Neoliberalism’ (2011) 9 Socio-
Economic Review 3, 10.
35 Talbot (n 10) especially 793.
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movements of  goods, services and especially capital, throughout the global economy. In the
context of  economic globalisation the establishment of  the centrality of  the global market
has thus required voluminous rules and institutions to loosen or eliminate government
regulation of  corporate behaviour in both domestic and international spheres; renouncing
the use of  government spending and taxing to moderate the instability of  the business cycle;
privatisation of  government enterprises and public responsibilities; and large cutbacks in
state social programmes.36 The result of  these and other changes to the structural parameters
of  commerce, including those effected through law, has been a diminished role for the board
of  directors, a marked redistribution of  the proceeds of  industry from labour to the share-
owning class and to small elites in industry and finance, downward pressure on wages, and a
sharp reversal of  the trend towards greater equality.37 However efficient the market is
purported to be at setting prices,38 it cannot be relied upon to ensure that commerce will
always act in the interests of  society.39 Indeed, what it does is divide the population into two
branches: those with economic power and those without it. Naturally enough, the latter
group is much larger in almost all societies. So the central issue here is the gulf  between that
which is conceptually possible and that which is realisable given the distribution of  power
and interests in society. The neoliberal worldview is, thus, likely to be antagonistic to a new
ethic of  the company as a social institution rather than a private enterprise.
What is uniquely characteristic of  the current period of  neoliberalism is the
extraordinary extent to which the specific embedding of  finance has been both deepened
and broadened. Such developments have within the literature been best captured by the
notion of  financialisation. It is, directly or otherwise, the subject of  all the literature on
neoliberalism, globalisation and stabilisation. Although a recent, still ill-defined term,
financialisation can be taken to mean, in essence, the ongoing and increasing role of
financial motives and the extension and growth of  ‘liberalised’ financial markets, financial
actors and financial institutions in the operation of  the domestic and international
economies.40 This economic order is one in which the financial markets exist primarily to
serve themselves. In this system, capital is raised for the purpose of  creating, selling and
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 65(4)
36 Kotz (n 18) 15. See also, A Dignam, ‘Lamenting Reform? The Changing Nature of  Common Law Corporate
Governance Regulation’ (2007) 25 Company and Securities Law Journal 283, 285, observing that: ‘Margaret
Thatcher’s admiration of  free market economists . . . soon had the UK engaging in wholesale reform of  its
public sector based upon market solutions. The privatisation of  public sector industries (Telecoms, Gas,
Water, Electricity, etc.), reform of  pension provision, health care, social welfare, the removal of  barriers to
capital inflow and outflows and the removal of  employment protection changed the nature of  the corporate
governance debate utterly within the course of  a decade. Government policy changed from giving priority to
creating employment to a focus on economic tools such as interest rate levels which could keep capital flowing
into the UK. Industrial democracy was replaced by shareholder oriented market based solutions.’
37 Ireland (n 20) 24.
38 On the subject of  share prices failing to adjust rapidly to new information, see S Bhagat and R Romano,
‘Event Studies and the Law: Part I – Technique and Corporate Litigation’ (2002) 4 American Law and
Economics Review 141, 143. On the fact that it cannot be taken for granted that share prices are a reliable
indicator of  corporate value, see A Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioural Finance (OUP 2000)
178–84; L A Stout, ‘Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law’ (2005) 3 Berkley Business Law
Journal 43.
39 S B Banerjee, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’ (2008) 34 Critical Sociology
51, 74; M T Jones, ‘Missing the Forest for the Trees’ (1996) 35 Business and Society 7, 7; R J Arneson,
‘Prospects for Community in a Market Economy’ (1981) 9 Political Theory 207, 207, noting that one hallowed
objection to a market economy is the supposed incapacity of  a market to supply the good of  the community;
J E Stiglitz, ‘Foreword’ in Polanyi (n 12) viii, asserting that ‘there is no respectable intellectual support for the
proposition that markets, by themselves, lead to efficient, let alone equitable outcomes’.
40 G Krippner, ‘The Financialization of  the American Economy’ (2005) 3 Socio-Economic Review 173, 174,
describing it more succinctly as ‘a pattern of  accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial
channels rather than through trade and commodity production’.
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trading securities and derivative securities that do not finance industry but instead trade
within markets that exist as an economy unto themselves.41 The rising significance of  (or
increasing reliance on) financial capital in the global economy is, for some, central to the
advancement of  neoliberalism.42 As Duménil and Lévy put it, ‘neoliberalism is the
ideological expression of  the reasserted power of  finance’.43 The resurgence and
continuing dominance of  neoliberalism, so the argument goes, can be explained, at least in
part, by changes in the competitive structure of  world capitalism, which have resulted in
turn from the particular form of  global economic integration that has developed in recent
decades.44 However, David Kotz astutely suggests that neoliberalism arose at the end of  the
1970s for reasons not directly related to the process of  financialisation. According to this
view, financialisation is an ever-present tendency in corporate capitalism and, because of
discrete neoliberal structural changes to release various constraints, it developed rapidly in
the favourable neoliberal institutional context. David Harvey has similarly remarked that
neoliberalism meant, in essence, the systematic financialisation of  everything and the
relocation of  the power centre of  capital accumulation to owners and their financial
institutions at the expense of  other factions of  capital. For this reason, he argues, the
support of  financial institutions and the integrity of  the financial system has become the
central concern collectively of  neoliberal states.45 It is submitted that these processes are
most likely to be symbiotic; one supports the other and vice versa.
3 regulatory capture of legislative reform
What is more certain is that the shift in gravity of  organisational activity from an
increasingly underinvested or obsolete productive base to the dysfunctional nature of
finance-driven growth and financial interests46 denotes a new form of  competition which
has worked to ‘reposition the shareholder at centre stage’.47 Indeed, for more than a decade
now a recurrent dimension to UK and US academic writing has expounded the
homogenising force of  global finance, the neoliberal logic of  which has assisted the
reassertion of  the shareholder-oriented conception of  the company being
constitutionalised and entrenched around the world by legal and extra-legal drivers.48 This
divisive phenomenon is frequently referred to within the company law academy as the
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41 L E Mitchell, ‘Financialism: A (Very) Brief  History’ in C Williams and P Zumbansen (eds), The Embedded Firm:
Corporate Governance, Labor, and Finance Capitalism (CUP 2011) 42.
42 Y Zhang and J Andrew, ‘Financialization and the Conceptual Framework’ (2013) Critical Perspectives on
Accounting doi: 10.1016/j.cpa.2012.11.012. 
43 G Duménil and D Lévy, ‘Costs and Benefits of  Neoliberalism: A Class Analysis’ (2001) 8 Review of
International Political Economy 578, 579.
44 D M Kotz, ‘Globalization and Neoliberalism’ (2002) 14 Rethinking Marxism 64, 65. See also, H A Giroux,
‘The Terror of  Neoliberalism: Rethinking the Significance of  Cultural Politics’ (2005) 32 College Literature 1,
2, remarking that neoliberalism is a ‘virulent and brutal form of  market capitalism’.
45 Harvey (n 12) 73.
46 F G Hill, ‘Veblen, Berle and the Modern Corporation’ (1967) 26 American Journal of  Economics and
Sociology 279, 281; Harvey (n 12) 32–3; J Froud, C Haslam, S Johal and K Williams, ‘Shareholder Value and
Financialization: Consultancy Promises, Management Moves’ (2000) 29 Economy and Society 80, 103.
47 B D Merino, A G Mayper and T D Tolleston, ‘Neoliberalism, Deregulation and Sarbanes–Oxley’ (2010) 23
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 774, 777.
48 P Ireland and R G Pillay, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in a Neoliberal Age’ in P Utting and J C Marques
(eds), Corporate Social Responsibility and Regulatory Governance (Palgrave 2009) 91. 
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shareholder value or shareholder primacy principle.49 It is generally regarded as applying in
relation to companies located in common law jurisdictions. The principle typically denotes,
in essence, the corporate managerial standard of  generating an optimal (or at least relatively
high) dividend or capital return from a company’s business for the main benefit of  its
shareholders.50 The varieties of  other stakeholders are to receive no inevitable primacy.51 It
is a convention that has been best captured by the Nobel laureate economist, Milton
Friedman, writing at a time when neoliberalism as a political project was in its incipient
stages, who influentially proclaimed that ‘the [only] responsibility of  business is to increase
profits’.52 It is easy for company lawyers to assume that managerial accountability to the
shareholders is not, in essence, an absurd or pernicious concept. A board of  directors, as
Adam Smith (and those influenced by his writing) observed long ago, is charged with taking
care of  other people’s money53 and it is usual in such circumstances for the law to impose
special and unremitting duties. For many the UK–US legal model, so it follows, elevates an
observable and measureable metric of  shareholder value to the extent that investor interests
have often been equated with corporate interests in this model of  governance. These
developments have prompted two US legal scholars, writing in 2001, to announce in
somewhat of  a provocative fashion, but not without some element of  validity, that we had
reached ‘the end of  history for corporate law’.54
Many legal scholars have criticised the shareholder value principle for a number of
reasons – including its perceived unfairness to non-shareholders and its appropriateness as
a touchstone for corporate governance – or questioned its doctrinal reflectivity. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, this principle as a perceived legally sanctioned norm of  managerial
conduct has historically found expression to only a very limited extent in pre-existing UK
or US legal rules.55 As Simon Deakin has said, ‘[i]t is surprisingly difficult to find support
within company law for the notion of  shareholder primacy’.56 In English company law, the
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49 For some of  the leading works on the principle, see J R Macey, ‘An Economic Analysis of  the Various
Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of  Corporate Fiduciary Duties’ (1991) 21
Stetson Law Review 23; S M Bainbridge, ‘In Defense of  the Shareholder Maximization Norm: A Reply to
Professor Green’ (1993) 50 Wash and Lee Law Review 1423; J Fisch ‘Measuring Efficiency in Corporate
Law: The Role of  Shareholder Primary’ (2006) Journal of  Corporation Law 637; B Black and R Kraakman,
‘A Self-enforcing Model of  Corporate Law’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 1911; D Gordon Smith, ‘The
Shareholder Primacy Norm’ (1998) 23 Journal of  Corporation Law 277; R Grantham, ‘The Doctrinal Basis
of  the Rights of  Company Shareholders’ (1998) 57(3) Cambridge Law Journal 554; C O’Kelly, ‘History
Begins: Shareholder Value, Accountability and the Virtuous State’ (2009) 60 Northern Ireland Law
Quarterly 35.
50 C Mayer, ‘Corporate Governance, Competition and Performance’ (1997) 24 Journal of  Law and Society 152,
155.
51 This includes, but is not limited to, the company’s employees, creditors and suppliers, surrounding
environment and community, consumers etc.
52 M Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of  Business is to Increase its Profits’ New York Times (New York 13
September 1970). A brief, but very useful deconstruction, of  Friedman’s purported views can be found in
Johnson (n 24) 451–2.
53 A Smith, The Wealth of  Nations (first published 1776, 5th edn Methuen & Co 1904) pt 1, ch 2.
54 Hansmann and Kraakman (n 6). Although, Andrew Keay astutely observes that since this bold proclamation
we have witnessed the collapse of  Enron, Worldcom etc. and, more recently, the demise or emasculation of
major banks such as Northern Rock in the UK and Lehman Brothers in the USA. All this has led to a greater
degree of  questioning the practical and normative value of  the shareholder value principle. See A Keay, The
Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance (Routledge 2012) 279.
55 See e.g. Moore and Rebérioux (n 7) 86; M Blair and L Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of  Corporate Law’
(1999) 85 Virginia Law Review 247.
56 S Deakin, ‘The Coming Transformation of  Shareholder Value’ (2005) 13 Corporate Governance 11, 11,
submitting that ‘[i]t is surprisingly difficult to find support within company law for the notion of  shareholder
primacy’.
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reference point for determining to whom directors owed their loyalty has historically been
found in Percival v Wright.57 According to this decision, it was for the directors to decide, in good
faith, on how best to promote the ‘interests of  the company’ in which they were involved.
In other words, directors were said in the case law to owe a duty of  loyalty to the company
itself, 58 but not to any individual shareholders or other persons. However, the term ‘interests
of  the company’ has, unsurprisingly, been regarded as a purposefully or carelessly imprecise
judicial construct.59 That is to say, the inherent generality of  the terms used to express these
obligations meant that they, in and of  themselves, provided no immediate standard against
which to measure the propriety or impropriety of  a director’s action in a particular case. The
proverbial question of  what a company’s ‘interest’ entails has thus featured in a continuing
substantial debate in English company law, perhaps above all else in the attitudes and
opinions that are shaped in legal monographs, law review articles and law school
classrooms,60 but also, to some extent, in the limited range of  cases where it has been
assumed the courts have attempted to impute some doctrinal meaning to the expression.61
In this regard, a slight number of  English authorities have been purported to equate the
interests of  the company with that of  the present and future shareholders and thus to
demonstrate the doctrinal significance of  the shareholder value principle.62 But these cases
make reference to the principle only in obiter dicta, confine any such remarks to the individual
case and do not directly address the issue of  directors’ duties, or the interests of  the
company has simply been measured from the perspective of  the ex ante bargain among
investors.63 It would appear that the US courts have also not been completely unequivocal
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57 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421. See also, Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co v Multinational Gas and
Petrochemical Services Ltd [1983] Ch 258; Grove v Flavel (1986) 43 SASR 410, 417 (Jacobs J); Peskin v Anderson
[2000] BCC 1110; affirmed [2000] EWCA Civ 326 (unreported, Court of  Appeal, Simon Brown, Mummery
and Latham LJJ, 14 December 2000).
58 This follows the seminal House of  Lords case of  Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL). For a useful
exposition of  the entity doctrine, see M A Pickering, ‘The Company as a Separate Legal Entity’ (1968) 31
Modern Law Review 481, especially 511, describing the evolution of  the company as a separate legal entity as
‘one of  the law’s greatest contributions to business and commerce’.
59 D Prentice, ‘Creditor’s Interests and Directors’ Duties’ (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies 265, 273,
referring to the expression as ‘indeterminate’. 
60 A Keay, ‘Formulating a Framework for Directors’ Duties to Creditors: An Entity Maximisation Approach’
(2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 614, 616, accurately capturing the vagueness of  the term in suggesting that
‘[w]hat is meant by “companies as a whole” is a vexed question, for it has been an extremely difficult phrase
to interpret’.
61 As pointed out by Nourse LJ in Brady v Brady (1987) 3 BCC 535, 552, this is an expression that is oft used, but
is rarely defined, and it is probably one of  the most problematical expressions in company law. Although, see
M Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of  the State (Hart 2013) 191 (and accompanying footnote),
suggesting that English as well as US courts have been traditionally reluctant to articulate exactly what the
pursuit of  a company’s ‘interest’ entails, ‘preferring instead to reserve such matters for ex ante resolution by
corporate contractors themselves’.
62 On the ostensible indications of  shareholder value as an objective of  companies in English law, see Re
Wincham Shipping (1878) LR 9 Ch D 322; Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 Ch D 654; Greenhalgh v
Arderne Cinemas [1951] Ch 286; Park v Daily News Ltd (1962) Ch 927; Gaiman v National Association for Mental
Health [1971] Ch 317; Brady v Brady (n 61).
63 For an excellent exposition of  this point, see e.g. Moore and Rebérioux (n 7) 95–100. See also, Keay (n 54)
53–5.
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in their acceptance of  shareholder value.64 It is thus possible to suggest that the substantive
law in these two countries, unexpectedly, has been agnostic on the important question of
management’s principal general duty.65
Following a second line of  legitimating argument, many corporate academics and
practitioners would identify the source of  the shareholder value principle as being the
‘arsenal of  governance powers’66 that equity holders possess to shape the rules of  corporate
governance.67 It is important to recognise that this vantage point rests on a particular
understanding of  the formal significance of  decision-making power for shareholders in the
English or US legal model. These governance rights are considered to provide assurance
that directors will not abuse the powers granted to them, thereby instilling confidence in
investors that capital may be safely entrusted to companies controlled by centralised
management. In respect of  English law, most texts and commentaries68 point to the
shareholder body retaining residual and ultimate decision-making authority through statute,
case law and the shareholder approval requirements in the UK Listing Authority’s Listing
Rules in decision areas that appear to raise acute agency problems arising from a direct
conflict of  interests. For certain of  these controls, shareholders are purported to have
various fundamental instruction and veto or approval rights, among which are the right to
vote on a limited number of  end-game governance issues in a general meeting69 and the
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64 The legal principle underlying US corporate governance, as enshrined in Delaware General Corporation Law,
§141, which is regarded as the most important state for company law, is that ‘[t]he business and affairs of  every
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of  a board of  directors’. Again, though, a slim
number of  authorities have equated the interests of  the company with those of  the shareholders. See Dodge v
Ford Motor Co, 170 NW 668, 684 (Mich, 1919); Revlon Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc, 506 A 2d 173,
179 (Del, 1986); Polk v Good, 507 A 2d 531, 536 (Del, 1986). For academic comment on the ambivalence of
US corporate law see, W T Allen, J B Jacobs and L E Strine, ‘The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on
Bridging the Conceptual Divide’ (2002) 69 University of  Chicago Law Review 147, 147; L A Stout, ‘Why We
Should Stop Teaching Dodge v Ford’ (2008) 3 Virginia Law and Business Review 163.
65 D G Baird and M T Henderson, ‘Other People’s Money’ (2008) 60 Stanford Law Review 1309, 1312,
suggesting that ‘[p]eople should know better [than to] paint themselves into embarrassing corners trying to
reaffirm the principle’.
66 C M Bruner, Corporate Governance in the Common Law World: The Political Foundations of  Shareholder Power (CUP
2013) 29. On the shareholder empowerment debate, see the particularly interesting and opposing arguments
contained in a special edition of  the Harvard Law Review: L A Bebchuk, ‘The Case for Increasing Shareholder
Power’ (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 833; S Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment’ (2006) 118 Harvard Law Review 1735.
67 M T Jones, ‘The Institutional Determinants of  Social Responsibility’ (1999) 20 Journal of  Business Ethics 163,
166, points out that: ‘[t]he intensely political nature of  the hierarchical relations of  the workplace are generally
conceptualised through the property rights discourse. Thus, the fact that management constitutes the legal
representation of  ownership interests enables it to decide what’s what in the firm; secondary stakeholders such
as employees and communities have only tenuous legal status in terms of  challenging managerial prerogative.’
68 D Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Texts and Materials (2nd edn OUP 2012) 189ff; P L Davies and
S Worthington, Gower and Davies: The Principles of  Modern Company Law (9th edn Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 435ff.
But see R Nolan, ‘The Continuing Evolution of  Shareholder Governance’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal
92, 93, who advocates that the doctrinal rights of  shareholders are manifested in companies legislation, while
cases about shareholders’ rights have only an ‘interstitial function, clarifying and fleshing out the relevant
legislation and corporate documentation’.
69 It is well established that UK directors, not shareholders, manage the business. See Companies Act 2006,
Model Articles, regs 3–4; Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34; L Sealy and
S Worthington, Cases and Materials in Company Law (OUP 2008) 167 and ch 4. For US examples, see, generally,
Del Code Ann Tit 8, §141(a) (2001); Model Bus Corp Act, §8.01(b); Paramount Communications, Inc v Time, Inc,
571 A2d 1140, 1154 (Del 1989); Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co v Dunsmore, 60 NH 85, 87 (1880).
right to sell their shares.70 Company law is considered to grant the right to vote on the
appointment and removal of  directors.71 Many scholars would also point to the notion that
shareholders have the nearly exclusive right to initiate legal proceedings for breaches of
directors’ duties.72 Yet in practice such a perspective pays insufficient attention to the
argument that the exercise of  these corporate governance rights is seriously curtailed by
significant practical impediments,73 or indeed that rights themselves are dialectical to the
extent that they contain intrinsic power while simultaneously reinforcing the institutions and
structures from where those rights emanate.74
We are subsequently left to infer within this legal vacuum that the current dominance of
the shareholder value principle in domestic and international corporate capitalism can be
attributed to exogenous and entrenched highly liquid market environments, as well as
institutional shareholder expectations, which have inculcated a range of  prevalent
shareholder-orientated managerial norms and practices from the late 1970s onwards.75 In
contrast to the 1930s, when Berle and Means were recording the dispersal of  ownership
among a myriad of  small, passive investors, which undermined the power and influence of
financial interests,76 recent decades under the direction of  a neoliberal agenda have
witnessed the gain of  momentum for a reconcentration of  share ownership.77 The growth
in newer forms of  concentration of  capital, in particular the private equity funds financed
by investment banks, asset management firms, pension and mutual funds, and hedge funds,
as well as the increase in informal shareholder activism which accompanied this
development, has precipitated a radical shift in the balance of  power within companies and
contributed to a dramatic change in corporate culture. With significance amounts of  equity
ownership, institutional investors could not sell without driving the share price down, so the
threat to sell or ‘voice’ becomes the better option than ‘exit’, and this is, in essence, the non-
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70 Under the corporate law of  the UK and US state law, the usual rule is that shares of  stock are freely
transferable. Corporate legislations do not see the need to specify the basic right of  property, but it is implicit
in statutory provisions regulating restrictions on share transfer.
71 Companies Act 2006, s 168. The corresponding US provision is Delaware General Corporation Law, §141(k).
72 In many common law jurisdictions, provision is made in companies legislation for the bringing of  derivative
actions: Companies Act 2006, ss 260–4 (UK); Canada Business Corporations Act 1985, s 239 (Canada);
Corporations Act 2001, pt 2F1A (Australia); Companies Act, s 216A (Singapore); Companies Act 1993, s 165
(New Zealand); and Companies Ordinance, s 168BC (Hong Kong). The US retains a common law derivative
action, the paternity of  which can be traced back to Robinson v Smith, 3 Paige Ch 222 (NY 1832). But see 
J C Coffee Jr, ‘Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game’ 78 Georgetown Law
Journal (1990) 1495, 1496.
73 A Keay, ‘Company Directors Behaving Poorly: Disciplinary Options for Shareholders’ (2007) Journal of
Business Law 656.
74 D Attenborough, ‘The Vacuous Concept of  Shareholder Voting Rights’ (2013) 14 European Business
Organization Law Review 147, 166–72.
75 P Ireland, ‘Financialization and Corporate Governance’ (2009) 60 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 1, 21,
observing that ‘it is . . . financial markets, under whose constant shadow executives now work, that have been
the key mechanism through which financial imperatives have been imposed on corporations and their
executives’.
76 A Berle and G Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New Brunswick 1932). This was simply an
extension of  Berle’s earlier studies in the law of  corporate finance. See A Berle, Studies in the Law of  Corporation
Finance (Callaghan & Co 1928). On the commonalities with the UK, see R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes and
A Shleifer, ‘Corporate Ownership around the World’ (1999) 54 Journal of  Finance 471, 491–8; R La Porta,
‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of  Political Economy 1113, 1147.
77 P L Davies, ‘Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom’ in D D Prentice and P R J Holland (eds),
Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance (Clarendon Press 1993) 70, proclaiming that: ‘[t]he dominance by the
financial institutions of  the market in the ordinary (equity) shares of  UK companies is a well-established fact’.
See also, B R Cheffins, ‘The Undermining of  UK Corporate Governance(?)’ (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 503.
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legal power as a social phenomenon we speak of  that permits modern investors to pressure
managers for increased, often short-term, returns.78 It is precisely this allocation of
property (rather than voting) rights which legal systems confer on the owners of  equity
capital through systems of  corporate governance as well as the highly concentrated nature
of  ownership that, in a critical sense, is an expression of  the relative power of  the bearer.79
At the same time, however, there have been important changes in the ways in which
corporate executives are remunerated – the rise of  ‘bonding mechanisms’ for company
management such as executive share options and other performance-related (often share-
price-related) remuneration – which have realigned their interests and brought them much
closer to those of  shareholders.80 With corporate strategies increasingly sensitive to investor
expectations, the maximisation of  shareholder value has emerged as the overriding
corporate goal. These non-legal drivers, as well as an academic and practitioner consensus
narrative, have become an underlying, and illegitimate, source of  law. It is against this
ideological framework, it is argued, that any examination of  the English legislative reform
process for directors’ duties must take place.
4 The rule in section 172
Since the end of  the 1990s, the volume of  writing on corporate governance as a subject of
legal and social-scientific81 enquiry has proliferated and, in consequence, the critical concept
has now become well-entrenched as academic and regulatory shorthand.82 It is sometimes
explicitly, but most of  the time implicitly, a conduit through which theoretical debates,
directly affecting other disciplines such as economics, politics and sociology, are conducted
concerning the inter-relationship between corporate constituents.83 The importance of  this
particular aspect of  company law is exemplified by the sentiments expressed in a law review
article published in 1964 that ‘the concern may be said to be with the political position of
the modern corporation, the role it is and should be playing in the distribution and
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78 On the idea that corporate managers are prone to operate in accordance with short-term time horizons, see
M Moore and E Walker-Arnott, ‘An Alternative View of  Corporate Short-Termism’ (2014) 41(3) Journal of
Law and Society 416. For a useful US example, see M Porter, ‘Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital
Investment System’ (1992) 65 Harvard Business Review 65.
79 Jones (n 39) 18, arguing convincingly that: ‘as financial markets have integrated on a transnational basis and
the composition of  equity holders has shifted from individual to institutional investors, finance capital has
become a dominant force in the international community’. See also, H Laski, A Grammar of  Politics (Allen &
Unwin 1925) 175ff.
80 M Jensen and W Meckling, ‘Theory of  the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of  Financial Economics 305, 308.
81 For an interesting perspective of  whether or not the law itself  and methods associated with the discipline is
truly a social science, see G Samuel, ‘Is Law Really a Social Science? A View from Comparative Law’ (2008)
67(2) Cambridge Law Journal 288.
82 Although Brian Cheffins observes that corporate governance only acquired a strong international dimension
in the 1990s, but the developments were identifiable as far back as the 1970s in America. See B R Cheffins,
‘The History of  Corporate Governance’ in The Oxford Handbook of  Corporate Governance (OUP 2013) ch 3. But
see, Keay (n 54) 1, who suggests that the term has been an important one in the commercial world as far back
as the birth of  the limited liability company; D D Prentice, ‘Some Aspects of  the Corporate Governance
Debate’ in Prentice and Holland (n 77) 26, noting, equally, that: ‘[t]his is not a new debate; concerns about
corporate governance have existed almost since the joint-stock company in its present form’.
83 Moore and Rebérioux (n 7) 85, observing that: ‘[a]lthough the term “corporate governance” literally applies
to any incorporated entity, corporate governance scholars tend to be primarily concerned with “public” or
listed corporate entities, whose securities are traded on regulated liquid investment markets’.
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enjoyment of  a great variety of  the values in which the community is interested’.84 Of
course, intellectual endeavour surrounding the scope, form and content of  directors’
general duties and how directors govern the corporate body is perhaps one of  the oldest
issues in company law and corporate governance. Indeed, it is also the issue that has proved
most intricate and difficult. These are the duties which company law applies directly to the
members of  the board as to limits within which they should exercise their powers. Prior to
the Companies Act 2006, English company law instantiated these duties through a
combination of  common law rules and equitable principles that can be traced back to the
nineteenth century. We have already seen that the absence of  clarity in the formation of  the
term ‘interests of  the company’ or any sort of  consensus narrative in the courts,
unsurprisingly, meant that these rules were thought by many to be too incoherent, sprawling
and anachronistic.85
The Law Commission was subsequently asked to consider the state of  the law and to
make recommendations. It did so carefully, concluding that the pre-existing substantive law
was too opaque and unclear. It ultimately recommended that it was necessary for only partial
(i.e. non-exhaustive) codification of  the settled directors’ general duties, leaving the courts
to prospectively develop any unsettled or new duties. The advantages of  this approach were
seen to lie in its flexibility. Following on from this report, the administratively independent
Company Law Review86 supported codification and proposed an exhaustive legislative
restatement of  duties to entirely replace the general law. The Company Law Review’s
recommendation that reform in the way of  full (i.e. exhaustive) codification was preferable
(but drafted at a sufficiently high level of  generality designed to enhance flexibility) was
accepted by the government and reforms were enacted in ch 2 of  pt 10 of  the Companies
Act 2006 that became operative on 1 October 2007 and 6 April 2008.87 It is apposite to note
that the transfer of  directors’ general duties from their existing common law and equitable
realm into the ‘arguably more rigid and politically reactive territory of  statutory law’88 was
an enduring and daunting one, beginning with a debate in the mid-1920s, with the idea being
rejected entirely on the basis that it would be a hopeless task. In the 1960s the Jenkins
Committee, despite concerns that it was not possible to provide specific definitions of  the
duties of  directors in legislation, did in fact promulgate some form of  codification. But
there was no follow-up on this recommendation. Deidre Ahern thus captures in this regard
the significance of  the present legislative spread in English company law, observing that ‘the
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84 H G Manne, ‘The “Higher Criticism” of  the Modern Corporation’ (1962) 62(3) Columbia Law Review 399,
399. See also, J Farrar, ‘Corporate Governance, Business Judgement and the Professionalism of  Directors’
(1993) 5 Corporate and Business Law Journal 1, 1, remarking on ‘the legitimacy of  corporate power, corporate
accountability and standards by which the corporation is to be governed and by whom’.
85 Davies and Worthington (n 68) 502, noting ‘[t]he substantial corpus of  learning on the nature and scope of  these
general fiduciary or equitable duties and duties of  skill and care [my emphasis added]’.
86 Company Law Review, Strategic Framework (n 5); Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a Competitive
Economy: Developing the Framework (Department for Trade and Industry 2000); Company Law Review, Modern
Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure (Department for Trade and Industry 2000);
Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report (Department for Trade and
Industry 2000). 
87 D Ahern, ‘Directors’ Duties, Dry Ink and the Accessibility Agenda’ [2012] Law Quarterly Review 114, 114,
raising doubt over whether full codification has in practice been achieved, the author notes that the new
statutory statement of  the duties of  directors represents ‘a partial codification of  the rich heritage of  pre-
existing equitable and common law principles [my emphasis added]’. See also Davies and Worthington (n 68)
503, remarking that: ‘[i]n the end, and despite the initial behavioural premises, the Act probably comes closer
to the Law Commissions’ view’.
88 Moore (n 61) 190 (and accompanying footnotes).
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transfer of  directors’ duties to a legislative scheme qualified as a major landmark in the
evolutionary history of  the duties’.89
The most conspicuous feature of  this legislative reform project is the reformulated core
duty of  loyalty found in s 172 of  the 2006 Act.90 The duty of  loyalty is the fiduciary duty
imposed on directors and trustees requiring them to prefer their duty to the company
instead of  intentionally exercising their management discretion to favour their own personal
interests. Section 172 constitutes an attempted codification of  the aforementioned formerly
imprecise judicial construct of  the interests of  the company. It forms one of  several
streamlined and clarified duties that are imposed on company directors;91 indeed, the
argument can be advanced that it is the governing section for determining the propriety of
directorial conduct under all the subsequent duties.92 Sarah Worthington has, equally,
described the duty of  loyalty as defining the process of  a director’s general decision-making
rather than any given resulting decision.93 For many, s 172 represents more than a
consolidation or simplification of  the pre-2006 Act common law rules; there were some
perceived subtle changes to the rules94 and Parliament legally mandated a neologism of  an
enlightened shareholder value95 approach to the duty of  loyalty. The Company Law Review
defined enlightened shareholder value as an obligation on directors to: ‘achieve the success
of  the company for the benefit of  the shareholders by taking proper account of  all the
relevant considerations for that purpose’ and this involves taking ‘a proper balanced view
of  the short and long term; the need to sustain effective ongoing relationships with
employees, customers, suppliers and others’ as well as to ‘consider the impact of  its
operations on the community and the environment’.96
Enlightened shareholder value is thus the idea that long-term business success depends
on regard for the interests of  all who contribute to and are affected by the myriad of
corporate endeavours and is purported to represent an alternative to a narrow conception
of  orthodox notions of  shareholder value.97 This has been referred to as moderating the
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96 Company Law Review, Developing the Framework (n 86) para. 2.11.
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stricter aspects of  capitalism.98 However, it is generally acknowledged that many open
issues remain in respect of  what is its most persuasive reading of  the statutory duty of
loyalty. This sentiment has been echoed in a recent law review article by Alan Dignam and
Michael Galanis, who have remarked that ‘directors’ fiduciary obligations . . . have remained
sufficiently vague so as to create a wide management discretion with regard to major
decisions’.99 Section 172 sets out, arguably, the most controversial and challenging duty that
has been introduced in the Act. That the provision can be described in this way is
demonstrated by the fact that it probably generated more substantial debate in Parliament
than any other provision contained in the whole of  the Act.100 It has similarly produced
voluminous scholarly writings leading up to (and going beyond) the legislation receiving
royal assent.
The new statutory formulation of  the fundamental duty of  loyalty owed by directors
comprises two significant aspects. First, s 172(1) begins by stating that a ‘director must act
in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of  the
company for the benefit of  its members as a whole’. This clearly reflects, while using
different wording, the elemental principle that it is for the directors to decide in good faith
what they perceive to be beneficial for the interests of  the company and this is ostensibly
animated by the company’s organisational aims and objectives.101 There are at first sight
aspects of  this subjective duty that are similar to what has been stated in earlier case law. For
example, in Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Brothers,102 Lord Cranworth LC said that ‘[a]
corporate body can only act by agents, and it is of  course the duty of  those agents [the
directors] so to act as best to promote the interests of  the corporation whose affairs they
are conducting’.103 A century later Lord Greene MR in Smith v Fawcett Ltd104 noted that
directors ‘must exercise their discretion bona fide in what they consider . . . is in the interests
of  the company’.105 On this reading, it is likely that the courts will be able to remain highly
receptive to the case law that addressed the precursor duty. This supposition is supported
by the fact that two post-2006 Act cases have said that the pre-existing law on the duty of
loyalty will be applied in dealing with cases initiated pursuant to s 172.106 For example,
Warren J in Cobden Investments Ltd107 said that the common law and statutory duty ‘come to
the same thing with the modern formulation giving a more readily understood definition of
the scope of  the duty’.108 To this extent, directors should take from the new provision the
simple, enduring maxim that the court will show deference to the exercise of  the board’s
contractually delegated managerial authority as to what was best calculated to serve the
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108 Ibid.
company’s overall welfare in any given instance, although this is subject to the overriding
jurisdiction of  the courts to assess objectively the conduct in question.109
However, this is not the full picture of  the formulation and content of  the director’s
reformulated duty of  loyalty. More fundamental still, the wording of  s 172, in fact, signals
a departure from this orthodox formulation of  the duty that it effectively succeeds and
introduces a different managerial obligation as a touchstone for corporate governance. As
we have seen, the pre-2006 Act common law rules on the issue of  to whom directors owed
their loyalty has for more than 150 years been associated with the interests of  the company
as an entity but not directly to any individual shareholders or other persons. This
indeterminacy of  the common law has allowed the courts, save for selective deference to
private ordering, to resist the temptation to ascribe judicially determined interests or goals
to the company.110 Section 172 challenges this classic doctrinal logic to the extent that it
‘juridifies and therefore concretises the “interests of  the company” (terminology which is
omitted from the statutory formulation), by defining the corporate objective explicitly in
terms of  the success of  the company for the benefit of  its shareholders as a whole [my emphasis
added]’.111 From one point of  view, the retention of  the ‘interests of  the company’ is
important primarily in relation to the enforcement of  directors’ duties.112 From another
point of  view, this means that, in respect of  defining the process or method of  a director’s
general decision-making, we see clearly that the Act mandates shareholder prerogative as the
core value of  UK corporate governance. The provision thus puts the expressed primacy of
shareholders on a legislative footing for the first time in English company law. David
Kershaw has raised the inference that ‘[o]ne might ask whether an enlightened shareholder
value approach is any different than an approach that simply focuses on shareholder
value’.113 The answer appears to be that there is no difference when viewed through the
prism of  hegemonic neoliberal thought. It is submitted that Carrie Bradshaw is correct in
her remarks that ‘enlightened shareholder value is not a challenge to the exclusivity of
shareholders’,114 but instead ‘provides a new strength to shareholder exclusivity by way of
an unambiguous statement in legislation [my emphasis added]’.115 It is argued that through
this lens the most representative reading of  the provision can be identified.
To be sure, careful attention to the wording of  the Act and the interpretation it supports
has, as is the case with s 172, generated a critical scholarly narrative of  the effects of  law
reform that represents radical change to an avowedly narrower duty of  loyalty and not
continuity with respect to what directors are actually expected to do.116 This change is a
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particularly acute problem in the context of  a legislative reform project because it occurred
despite the absence of  a legal and formal mandate to this effect in the area of  directors’
general duties. A compelling case can be made that the shareholder-oriented conception of
the company was formed not from the pre-existing substantive law itself, but instead
through the prevalent short-term, stock-market-based pressures of  finance, the neoliberal
logic of  which has assisted the legislative imperative of  the shareholder value principle in
English company law. It is suggested that this is what David Millon, writing in 2012, was
referring to when he spoke astutely of  ‘the redefinition of  the corporate purpose without
law’.117 But the fact of  the matter is that major policy decisions and law-making ‘are the
product of  many institutional forces’.118 It is argued, as we have seen, that this shareholder-
oriented conception of  the company is ultimately a reflection of  the ‘seismic changes which
took place in the corporate world during the neoliberal counter-revolution’ from the late
1970s onwards,119 which have given rise to the expectations of  investors increasingly
finding expression in legal determinants as well as extra-legal drivers that actually shape
management behaviour.120
For some time, the alleged defects of  English law have received a great deal more
attention than its merits. It is therefore easy to overlook real achievements, among which
one of  the more conspicuous is that the 2006 Act does not, at the very least, continue on
the false assumption that the paradigm company in English law is a large, publicly quoted,
for-profit business.121 A company can be established for a myriad of  specific purposes or
even lengths of  time; large British multinational banking and financial services companies,
public teaching and research universities, charitable organisations, joint ventures, holding
companies, clubs and societies, and many, many more are incorporated under, and have
legal existence, by virtue of  the companies’ legislation. These are deliberately extreme
examples chosen to make an important point. The obligation, as part of  the duty of  loyalty,
to promote the success of  the company for the benefit of  its shareholders as a whole means
that English company law provides an ‘adjectival’ principle which is capable of  governing
how a diversity of  possible corporate constitutions may lawfully and legitimately be
pursued. In particular, the provision uses such an opaque term as ‘success’ because it is a
concept which necessarily requires a referent to provide it with a whole meaning. This
referent is, perhaps unexpectedly, not prescribed through English companies’ legislation as
such, but is instead supplied from the shareholders as market participants (e.g. the
company’s constitution, shareholders’ decisions and so on) in any given corporate economy.
As the Attorney General (as he was then) Lord Goldsmith stated: ‘[s]uccess means what the
[shareholders] collectively want the company to achieve. For a commercial company,
success will usually mean . . . increase in value. For . . . charities and community interest
companies, it will mean the attainment of  the objectives for which the company has been
established.’122
An exclusively shareholder-oriented conception of  the company in the nature of  things
thus means that the law has created, and then extracted itself  from, a self-sustaining,
market-driven ecosystem in which it is essentially for the shareholders of  the company to
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formulate the organisational aims they wish to achieve as well as having the authority to
determine collectively whether these aims have been successfully met by the board. As pointed
out earlier, this line of  thinking is consistent with the Company Law Review’s expressed
presumption against interventionist legislation and in favour of  facilitating markets.123 It
had, equally, limited its scope to law reform rather than concerning itself  with wider ethical
or managerial issues about the behaviour of  participants in companies.124 The same basic
logic finds its origins in an aforementioned argument that the state is not, as frequently
posited under the rhetoric of  neoliberalism, external or involuntarily relinquishing
sovereignty to the market, but is a qualitatively different state that purposefully establishes
and preserves through constant action an artificial institutional framework appropriate to
such competitive practices.125 If  markets do not exist, so the argument follows, then they
must be created or reconfigured, by state action if  necessary. But beyond these efforts the
state should remove itself  from the economy, including corporate affairs. Observing this,
one cannot help submit that a not altogether unfair epilogue to this assessment is the
important point that, while one simply cannot equate companies with trading at a profit,
this is indeed the most common use of  the corporate form. This, of  course, means that
success for commercial companies will typically involve an increase in the value of  the
company’s shares, or at least the maximisation of  the company’s profits. It is in many ways
odd that, during a period when the shareholder value principle and shareholder
expectations, as well as managerial short-termism, are frequently asserted causes of  many
of  the catastrophic ills of  the global financial system over recent decades,126 yet under
English company law the entrenching of  financialisation and shareholder interests is now
presented ex cathedra as a metric of  corporate performance.
The second aspect of  the duty is that, as a corollary of  promoting the success of  the
company for the benefit of  the members as a whole, an ancillary obligation is expressly
imposed on corporate management to ‘have regard (amongst other matters)’ to the non-
exhaustive factors and constituencies set out in sub-paragraphs (a)–(f).127 Under this
approach, directors, while ultimately required to promote shareholder interests, must take
into account an extensive list of  internal and external factors when considering what
promotes shareholder interests. This ‘regard list’ in s. 172 includes, but is not limited to,
long-term consequences, employee interests, relations with suppliers, customers and others,
impact on the community and environment, and the company’s reputation for high
standards and business conduct. The inclusion of  these non-member interests might be
seen as involving the development of  sustainability, good relations with constituencies and
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enhancing reputation, all of  which might well lead to success for the company.128 This
aspect is thus purported to engender the ‘enlightened’ element of  the enlightened
shareholder value approach preferred by the Company Law Review and the government.
An inference that may be drawn from its inclusion in the Act is that it has the potential to
displace the ideology of  corporate performance measured solely and simplistically through
maximising short-term shareholder value; those non-contractual expectations and cultural
values, such as trust, social welfare and fairness, are important as well.129 This is, of  course,
bound up with the enduring and fundamental argument in corporate governance that the
shareholders are not the only group whose well-being is affected by corporate decisions.130
Corporate academics and practitioners have fervently debated the best reading of  this
second aspect of  the provision. At one end of  the continuum, some have suggested
optimistically that the introduction of  stakeholder interests into the statutory vocabulary
represents significant corporate legal movement involving change incorporating some form
of  broader stakeholder mandate.131 This is a view that is also informed by, and depends
greatly upon, the reports of  the Company Law Review and the ministerial statements made
in Parliament during the legislative debates. Occupying the middle distance, we find limited
support for the view that, while this aspect of  the provision does not signal radical change
to directors’ general duties, it is going to be principally cultural or educational for corporate
management in presenting stakeholder interests as part of  a choice architecture in order to
positively influence decision-making. It is a line of  thinking which, in essence, frames this
aspect of  the duty as a form of  ‘nudge’ regulation, which is a concept that has in recent
years been promulgated by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein.132 At the other end of  the
spectrum, there has been a lot of  derision over the perceived failure on the part of  the
government to fulfil a commitment or responsibility to redefine a more nuanced conception
of  the company as a social institution rather than as a purely private enterprise. In this way,
any reference to non-member interests is viewed as a little more than a rhetorical flourish.
Dan Prentice has said of  a social responsibility on the part of  companies at a general level
that ‘[o]ne must concede . . . that these statements have often appeared aspirational in their
thrust and have not provided a detailed blueprint for concrete action’.133
It is thus fair to suggest that the issue of  how enlightened shareholder value relates to,
and impacts on, corporate governance has atomised the opinions of  legal academics and
practitioners. What is perhaps more fundamental is that the generalised inability to
conceptualise and find answers to the particular use of  statutory language indicates
legislative ambiguity or obscurity as to the precise meaning of  this aspect of  the duty. A
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problem in statutory construction can seriously trouble the courts when there is a contest
between probabilities of  meaning. There is, equally, an anxiety relating to whether the
drafting of  s 172 results in a duty likely to be better understood by directors than the pre-
existing substantive common law so that compliance can be achieved. This is despite the
fact that certainty, accessibility and simplification were strategic Company Law Review
objectives. Principles of  statutory interpretation allow the court, where the meaning of
legislation is ambiguous or obscure, to resort in limited circumstances to ministerial statements
made at the time of  the passage of  legislation.134 However, the nature of  the legislative
process means that treating statements of  ministers in Parliament as probative evidence of
parliamentary intention is controversial.135 Pursuant to the rule in Pepper v Hart, what the
executive intended, as stated in Parliament, may be relied on as an interpretive aid where that
record of  intention is so ‘clear and unequivocal’ that it would ‘almost certainly settle the
matter immediately one way or the other’.136 The parliamentary statements and material on
s 172 do not satisfy this threshold condition and should not therefore be considered by a
court. The problem is compounded by the omission to explain precisely where the
restatement diverges from settled jurisprudence surrounding the duty of  loyalty.
It is submitted, however, that the meaning of  the second aspect of  the restated duty of
loyalty and therefore the duty itself  is patently clear and unambiguous. As already discussed,
corporate management has an ultimate responsibility under the Act to promote the success
of  the company for the concretised and exclusive benefit of  the shareholders as a whole.
This, of  course, at least insofar as ordinary commercial companies are concerned, will
involve an increase in the value of  the company’s shares, or at least the maximisation of  the
company’s profits. This is the imperative of  private ownership of  capital: to maximise
returns by reducing costs and ensuring maximum fluidity to seek out the highest performers
over the short term.137 The formalised attendant ‘regard list’ of  various socio-economic
factors, as a practical matter, is expressly unequal to this principal objective, and non-
shareholder interests are valued only instrumentally to achieving this economic-
individualistic objective rather than as a substantive programme of  action to address real
concerns based on any ethical or intrinsic value.138 Acting in a socially responsible manner
is thus conflated and confused with rational economic behaviour. The provision, at the very
most, might be said to educate or ‘nudge’ corporate management to assume more unselfish,
ethical behaviour during the relentless focus on satisfying claims of  private property
ownership. But it is a ‘fallacious assumption that as a matter of  fact there is no conflict
between shareholder value and wider socially responsible corporate activity’.139 It is, equally,
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impermissible for non-shareholder constituencies to have legal standing to enforce any
possible breach of  failing to have regard for their interests under the derivative action in
pt 11 of  the 2006 Act. Enforcement of  the duty is limited to the board of  directors, a
majority of  shareholders, a minority of  shareholders via derivative claims under pt 11 of  the
Act, and liquidators acting on behalf  of  an insolvent company.140 From this perspective,
the purported enlightened or progressive bent of  the restated duty of  loyalty can thus be
likened without any great inaccuracy to the emperor’s new clothes. The ‘enlightened’
discourse simply obfuscates the essential forces driving business activity, as well as the
pressures to which companies and decision-makers are subjected.
This conclusion, as things stand today, is to be expected within the political project of
neoliberalism and the highly financialised, shareholder-oriented structures of  corporate
governance. The enlightened shareholder value principle, it is argued, is responsible for
distorting much of  the thinking about company law reform in recent years. This need not
be the case. Despite its emancipatory rhetoric, discourses of  broader social concerns are
defined typically by narrow business interests and serve to curtail interests of  non-
shareholders.141 As we have seen, the principle does nothing to dislodge the view that the
objective of  a company’s business is the pursuit of  shareholder interests because it is
essentially oriented toward system management rather than system negation. It is, and
purports to be, only a general ideological adjunct that provides a visible legitimating
narrative to the dominance of  an exclusive focus on shareholder value.142 While re-
legitimising the shareholder-oriented paradigm through the artful manipulation of  legal
doctrine, the perceived formalised legislative integration of  non-shareholder interests into
management’s calculus also serves the imperatives of  capital accumulation through co-
opting or marginalising the more excessive socio-economic demands of  these
stakeholders.143 Indeed, under the logic and language of  neoliberalism, enlightened
shareholder value reflects a rarely acknowledged, yet fundamental perspective on the
increasing misalignment between the powers of  private ownership claims and socio-
economic interests that has in recent decades found expression politically, economically
and, of  course, legally.144 Perhaps in this regard the principle should be seen not as the
invisible garments of  a powerful sovereign ruler, but as a wolf  in sheep’s clothing – an
efficiently distributive, malignant thought collective that is partially concealed by a symbolic,
kinder and gentler representation.
5 Conclusion
This article may be viewed throughout as simply an illustration of  just how a particular
configuration of  institutional and political-economic elements shape the resolution of
nearly every issue of  law-making as well as one’s thinking about how political process
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oriented conception of  the company there has been, to varying degrees, a steady abrogation of  stakeholder
interests. At the same time, the interests of  non-shareholder constituencies are being co-opted into ‘soft’ law
or other non-legal instruments which either lack binding force altogether or whose binding force is noticeably
weaker than that usually associated with ‘hard’ law.
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operates and law-making generally. Implicit in this article is the argument that previous
writings on the reformulated duty of  loyalty have so far failed to systematically address the
persistent ideological determinants of  companies organised for profit to pursue purposively
those socio-economic ends that conflict with the presumptive logic of  classical economics.
The analysis of  the reasserted power of  finance, the neoliberal logic and language of  which
has repositioned the shareholder at centre stage, clearly shows us that current corporate
governance structures, theoretically, empirically and normatively, dissolve any management
objective other than shareholder value. The neoliberal worldview is, therefore, antagonistic
to any purported ethic of  the company as a social institution rather than a private enterprise.
We have seen, unexpectedly, that the pre-existing substantive common law, as a practical
matter and within the limited range of  cases pertinent to this article, probably provided no
substantial statutory or judicial authority to convincingly support this essential change to
directors’ general duties. However, the particular understanding of  a politically determined
and legally contingent phenomenon, it has been argued, helps to explain how the primacy
of  the exclusively shareholder-oriented conception of  the company has now been
enshrined in the 2006 Act. To many observers, the imperatives of  private ownership of
capital are to maximise returns by reducing costs and ensuring maximum fluidity to seek out
the highest performers over the short term.
The global financial crisis has led to calls for greater corporate accountability and
heightened controls over such industrial practices. Moreover, as already mentioned, classical
economic imperatives leave no room in the management calculus to pursue socio-economic
ends that conflict with the presumptive shareholder desire to maximise profits. Cast in this
light, this perhaps distasteful, but definitely authoritative, principle of  English company law
is now in search of  ideological legitimation or, at the very least, ideological elegance. The
Company Law Review and UK government’s concept of  enlightened shareholder value
purport to provide a solution in diverting management’s attention to non-shareholder
interests, including the environment, employees and local communities, as well as being seen
as critical to generating long-term success. It is fair to suggest that the issue of  what is the
best reading of  this aspect of  the reformulated duty of  loyalty has been subject to a mixed
reception. What is perhaps more fundamental, the generalised inability to conceptualise and
find answers to the particular use of  statutory language would seem to indicate legislative
ambiguity or obscurity as to the precise meaning of  this aspect of  the duty. However, the
law, it is argued, is not opaque or indeterminate. The epistemologically flawed ‘other-
regarding’ aspect of  the duty is patently subordinated to the expressed primacy of
shareholder interests. The duty, equally, provides no method of  enforcement to these non-
shareholder interests to enforce any potential breach of  s 172. Instead, what the enlightened
aspect of  the duty does is provide an ideological adjunct that acts as a visible legitimating
narrative to the dominance of  an exclusive focus on shareholder value.
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